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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

)
APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF

v.

])
)
]

RICHARD WARREN PEARSON,

;)

Case no. 20041096 - CA

Defendant/Appellant.

'

Plaintiff/Appellee,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court obtains jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Defendant was convicted of the following counts
before the Honorable Dennis Fredrick, Third District Court, State of Utah: three
counts of Misuse of Public Money, second degree felonies; one count of Theft, a
second degree felony; and one count of Communications Fraud, a second degree
felony. (R. at 02-03). The Honorable Dennis Fredrick denied Appellant's request
for a restitution hearing, which was filed and entered on the court's docket on
November 16, 2004. A notice of appeal was timely filed on December 16, 2004.

ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for
a restitution hearing where a hearing was requested at sentencing and where, at
sentencing, the trial court indicated that a hearing would be held if the parties were
unable to negotiate an agreement.
Standard of Review: An appellate court will normally not disturb a trial
court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise
constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, the issue as to whether the pertinent
statute required the trial court to hold a hearing presents a question of law, which
is reviewed for correctness. State v. Breeze, 2001 UT App 200, \ 5, 29 P.3d 19, 21
(UtahApp. 2001).
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing where
Clark Harms, counsel for the State, requested a restitution hearing on behalf of
both parties due to a continuing disagreement concerning the amount of restitution
due. Defense counsel effectively joined in this request. (Sentencing Transcript
from February 20, 2004 at 5).

Issue 2: Whether a restitution hearing is otherwise required where the trial
court failed to state on the record its reasons for the restitution order as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302.
Standard of Review: An appellate court will normally not disturb a trial
court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise

constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, the issue as to whether the pertinent
statute required the trial court to state its reasons for the restitution amount on the
record is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Id.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing when the
court indicated, in response to counsel's concerns, that it would inquire into all
claims as to the determination of restitution at a separate restitution hearing if the
parties failed to negotiate a resolution as to the amount due.

(Sentencing

Transcript from February 20, 2004 at 7).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are
referred to in Appellant's Brief and are reproduced at Addendum A: Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-302.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
On October 8, 2003, an information was filed wherein the Appellant,

Richard Pearson, was charged with three counts of Misuse of Public Money,
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402(2); one count
of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; and
one count of Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). (R. at 002-003).
3

B.

Disposition in Trial Court
On December 19, 2003, Mr. Pearson entered guilty pleas to the

aforementioned charges. (R. at 32). He was sentenced on February 20, 2004, to
five consecutive one to fifteen year prison terms. (R. at 49). However, the prison
terms were suspended and Mr. Pearson was placed on probation for 36 months.
(R. at 50). As part of his probation, Mr. Pearson was ordered to serve 150 days in
the Salt Lake County Jail, attend cognitive restructuring classes by AP&P, was
prohibited from obtaining employment in a position of financial trust, and was
disqualified from holding any public office for the remainder of his life.
In addition, Mr. Pearson was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
$131,541.13. (R. at 50). During the sentencing hearing, both parties contested the
restitution amount, explained that the figure was inaccurate, and requested a
restitution hearing. (Sent. Trans, at 5).
C

Course of Proceedings
At the sentencing hearing on February 20, 2004, in response to counsel's

request for a restitution hearing, the court instructed both parties to continue
negotiations and, if possible, agree on an acceptable amount for restitution. (Sent.
Trans, at 7). In the event the parties could not agree on an amount, Mr. Pearson
was instructed to notify the court and it would schedule a restitution hearing where
a full hearing to determine the amount of restitution would be conducted. (Sent.
Trans, at 7). When an agreement could not be reached, on September 8, 2004,
Appellant filed a motion requesting the trial court to hold a restitution hearing. (R.

4

at 55).

On November 16, 2004, the District Court filed an order denying

Appellant's request for a restitution hearing. (R. at 69).

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
INTRODUCTION
The following facts will demonstrate that on February 20, 2004, the State
and Mr. Pearson recognized and explained to the court that they both disputed the
restitution figure derived by AP&P. Neither party considered the figure to be
accurate. Consequently, a restitution hearing was requested in order to determine
the appropriate amount. The court instructed the parties to attempt to negotiate a
resolution and promised a restitution hearing should the parties reach impasse in
negotiations. Subsequently, when negotiations failed, Mr. Pearson filed a motion
requesting a restitution hearing; however, the court denied the motion and declined
to take any evidence regarding the appropriate amount. As a result, Mr. Pearson
has been forced to pay restitution in excess of that required by Utah Code Ann. §
77-38a-302.
THE UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS
Before the subject case arose, Mr. Pearson was an employee of the
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC). (R. at 4). In his position
with DABC he was charged with the oversight of various department finances and
was authorized to sign checks on some DABC accounts. (R. at 4). On or about
March 13, 2003, an anonymous informant telephoned the State Bureau of

Investigation and alleged that Mr. Pearson had diverted DABC funds for private
use. (R. at 4). As a result, the State Bureau of Investigation began to investigate
Mr. Pearson's involvement with DABC. (R. at 4). During the course of the
investigation, the State Bureau of Investigation concluded that Mr. Pearson had
used DABC funds for "both legitimate and illegitimate" purposes.

(R. at 4).

Specifically, the agency believed Mr. Pearson had used DABC funds to set up a
legitimate petty-cash or "slush fund" of sorts but used some of the money for
illegitimate purposes such as paying for Sparta United Soccer uniforms and
equipment. However, the fund was also used to fund an employee gym at DABC,
to purchase candy for machines located in DABC's office, and to provide
unofficial employee Christmas funds and bonuses. (R. at 4).
Mr. Pearson was subsequently charged regarding the misuse and
mismanagement of public monies in his position with DABC. (R. at 2-3). On
October 8, 2003, an information was filed charging Mr. Pearson as follows: Count
I, Misuse of Public Money; Count [I, Theft; Count III, Misuse of Public Money;
Count IV, Communications Fraud; and Count V, Misuse of Public Money. (R. at
2-3). On December 19, 2003, he pled guilty to these charges. (Change of Plea
Transcript from December 19, 2003 at 6-7).
During the change of plea hearing, Mr. Pearson's Attorney, Mr. Thomas
Rasmussen, and Counsel for the State, Ms. Anne Cameron, discussed the issue of
restitution with the court. (Plea Trans, at 11-12.) Specifically, Mr. Rasmussen
recognized that the amount of restitution requested by the State, over $131,541.13,
6

appeared to be inordinately high and he was currently working with Ms. Cameron
to determine a more accurate restitution amount. (Plea Trans, at 12). As a result,
the court continued sentencing until February 20, 2004, in part to give Mr.
Rasmussen and Ms. Cameron adequate time to calculate a more accurate figure.
(Plea Trans, at 13).
THE REQUEST AT SENTENCING
On February 20, 2004, Mr. Pearson was sentenced regarding the
aforementioned charges; Clark Harms represented the State on behalf of Ms.
Cameron; Mr. Rasmussen represented Mr. Pearson. (Sent. Trans, at 2). At this
hearing, the court recognized that the office of Adult Probation and Parole had
estimated the amount of restitution to be $131,541.13. (Sent. Trans, at 5) Mr.
Harms indicated that the State would be seeking an additional $60,649 in
restitution beyond that estimate. (Sent. Trans, at 5). However, Mr. Harms also
conceded that $76,000 included in that estimate went to the benefit of DABC and
he was "not quite sure how to deal with that." He further stated, "your Honor's
going to have to decide [the disagreement over the restitution amount] at the
restitution hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5). Mr. Harms also explained that Mr.
Pearson was contesting the restitution amount because he believed the actual
amount was much lower. (Sent. Trans, at 5).
Due to the disagreement of both parties concerning the accurate amount of
restitution, Mr. Harms stated, "we'd be asking the court to set a restitution
hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5). Consequently, the court initially set restitution in the
7

amount of $131,541.14, "until such time and if that number is modified by this
Court." (Sent Trans, at 6). Furthermore, the court recognized, "that leaves open
the potential for negotiation between [Mr. Pearson's] attorney and those at the
State who do have knowledge about what their records reflect.

If there is no

satisfactory conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this Court... and I
will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 7). The court also
stated that, at the restitution hearing, "all of the claims will be inquired into and a
determination will be made." (Sent. Trans, at 7).
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HEARING REQUEST
The parties never reached an agreement as to the amount of restitution and
Mr. Rasmussen withdrew as counsel for Mr. Pearson on July 22, 2004. (R. at 54).
On September 8, 2004, John Hutchison filed an appearance of counsel with the
court. (R. at 55). Since the parties had been unable to determine a mutually
acceptable restitution figure, Mr. Hutchison, pursuant to the court's prior
instruction, filed a motion requesting a restitution hearing.

(R. at 5).

Ms.

Cameron objected to the hearing and took the erroneous position that a request for
a hearing was never made at the time of sentencing; however Ms. Cameron was
not present at that hearing. (R. at 57; Sent. Trans, at 2). In addition, the State
alleged that the pre-sentence report made a sufficient determination of restitution
and that the court was authorized to rely on the report. (R. at 58). The court
scheduled oral arguments to discuss the need for a restitution hearing on October
8, 2004; however, that hearing was continued. (Restitution Hearing Transcript I
ft

on October 8, 2004 at 3). The hearing was rescheduled for the next available date,
November 5, 2004. (Rest. Hear. Trans. I at 3).
On November 5, 2004, Mr. Hutchison and Ms. Cameron appeared before
the court to discuss Mr. Pearson's motion for a restitution hearing. (Restitution
Hearing Transcript II on November 5, 2004). At the hearing, Mr. Hutchison
reiterated that a restitution hearing was necessary. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 4).
Furthermore, he argued that there were no other time limits dictating when the
restitution hearing should be scheduled.

(Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 2-3). Mr.

Hutchison also illuminated the discrepancies with the current restitution figure and
indicated that Mr. Pearson needed an opportunity to present those discrepancies to
the court and have them considered.

AP&P had erroneously included costs

incurred to buy Gym equipment and office supplies that DABC used and currently
possessed. Many of these expenditures were authorized and legitimate but were
erroneously included as restitution nonetheless.

(Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 4).

Finally, Mr. Hutchison reminded the court that Mr. Pearson was asking for this
restitution hearing pursuant to the court's order. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 5).
After taking the matter under advisement, on November 16, 2004, the Court
denied Mr. Pearson's motion for a restitution hearing and he was not given an
opportunity to present evidence regarding the proper calculation of restitution. (R.
at 69).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-302(4) requires the court to hold a restitution
hearing whenever a defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution. In the instant case, Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing
during sentencing because he objected to the amount of restitution. Mr. Pearson
argued at sentencing that the actual amount of restitution was much lower than
$131,541.13 and he desired an opportunity to present this argument to the court.
Consequently, Mr. Pearson, relying on Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), objected
to the amount of restitution during his sentencing hearing and the trial court erred
when it denied Mr. Pearson the restitution hearing to which he was entitled.
Moreover, the State also explained that the figure was inaccurate and likely
included purchases that appeared to be legitimate. In response to the fact that both
parties disputed the amount of restitution, the court specifically instructed the
parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution. The court stated unequivocally that a
restitution hearing should be requested and held if negotiations failed. However,
the court erroneously denied Mr. Pearson's request, which was made in
accordance with the procedure set forth by the court.
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3) requires the court to make
the reasons by which it determined the restitution amount part of the court record.
In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate on the record any reasons
regarding how it determined the amount of restitution to be $131,541.13. The
court did not put any reasons on the record during the sentencing hearing and

indicated that if the parties could not agree on a restitution amount a complete
record would be made during the restitution hearing.

The Court, in effect,

recognized that the figure was inaccurate. Both parties told the court that the
figure was inaccurate. In this regard, where the court knew the figure to be
inaccurate, it temporarily imposed an arguably arbitrary figure pending
negotiations. Consequently, the trial court erred when it later declined to hold the
restitution hearing and never made the reasons by which it determined the amount
of restitution part of the court record.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD A
RESTITUTION HEARING PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-38a-302 WHEN A RESTITUTION HEARING
WAS REQUESTED AT SENTENCING AND WHERE THE
SENTENCING COURT INDICATED A HEARING
WOULD BE HELD IF THE PARTIES COULD NOT
NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION.
In this case, both Mr. Pearson and the State disagreed with the amount of

restitution determined by AP&P. Both parties told the court, at sentencing, that
the figure was inaccurate. Both parties indicated that a restitution hearing was
necessary. In response, the court instructed the parties to attempt to negotiate a
resolution but promised a restitution hearing if negotiations were unproductive.
However, when negotiations failed and a hearing was requested, the court refused
to hold the previously promised hearing. Where the court set forth a procedure to
determine restitution and then failed to follow that procedure, Defendant was
11

denied the opportunity to challenge the figure that both parties previously stated
was inaccurate.
Restitution is governed by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-101. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides criteria
for a court to follow when determining a restitution amount. The statute states, in
pertinent part, "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution
of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a
full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4); State v. Weeks, 458
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, \\2, 61 P.3d 1000, 1007 (Utah 2002)(emphasis added). In
State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 12 P.3d 110, this court reiterated that "[i]t is
proper for the trial court to impose restitution at sentencing unless defendant
objects to its imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount at that time."
Id. at f9, 113; See also State v. Breeze, 2001 UT App 200, Tf6; 29 P.3d 19, 21
(Utah App. 2001).
However, where the defendant requests a restitution hearing, it is reversible
error for the court to fail to hold such a hearing. State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284,
1289 (Utah App. 1998). The language of § 77-38a-302(4) is "unambiguous and
unconditional" in that regard. Breeze, 2001 UT App at |10; 29 P.3d at 22. If a
defendant objects to a restitution amount at or before the sentencing hearing, the
trial court must allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. Id. (emphasis
added).

12

In the instant case, Mr. Pearson objected to the amount of restitution that
the trial court imposed on him during his sentencing hearing.

Clark Harms,

representing the State, even initially raised the issue and specifically noted Mr.
Pearson's dispute over the restitution amount and then stated, "we'd be asking the
Court to set a restitution hearing." Both parties effectively joined in this request,
hence Mr. Harm's use of the word "we." Consequently, the language of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38(a)-302(4) required the trial court to hold a restitution hearing
pursuant to Mr. Pearson's request.
The word "shall" is presumed to indicate mandatory compliance and has
been interpreted as such in this and other jurisdictions. Moore v. Schwendiman, 75
P.2d 204, 207 (Utah App. 1988). Therefore, the statute made it mandatory for the
trial court to hold a restitution hearing at Mr. Pearson's request. Consequently,
when Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing so that he could present
mitigating evidence concerning the amount of restitution owed, the trial court was
obligated to schedule a hearing and did not have the authority to decline to hold
such hearing.
Furthermore, at the time the request was made, the trial court recognized
Mr. Pearson's objection to the amount of restitution and indicated that a restitution
hearing was available for him. The trial court expressed its preference for the
matter to be resolved through continued negotiations and without a hearing;
however, it recognized that an evidentiary hearing may be required, stating, "[i]f

there is no satisfactory conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this
Court... and I will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 7).
Despite Mr. Pearson's request for a restitution hearing and the court's
indication that it would comply with that request, no restitution hearing was held.
As a result, Mr. Pearson was denied his statutory right to present mitigating
evidence as to the amount of restitution owed.
In the State's motion in opposition to the requested restitution hearing, Ms.
Cameron unintentionally misrepresented the facts from the sentencing hearing. In
her motion in opposition to Mr. Pearson's request for a restitution hearing, Ms.
Cameron indicated, "[t]he defendant's motion was not made nor was the issue
raised at the defendant's sentencing on February 20, 2004, as it should have been
according to § 77-3 8(a)-302(4) of the Utah Code." The sentencing transcript
clearly shows the issue was raised at the sentencing hearing when Mr. Harms
specifically noted Mr. Pearson's dispute over the restitution amount and then
stated, "we'd be asking the Court to set a restitution hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5).
Unfortunately, Ms. Cameron was not present at the sentencing hearing and
she was evidently not made aware that this request was made. Consequently, her
misrepresentation to the trial court that no request had been made was likely an
oversight. Nonetheless, where the sentencing transcript clearly shows a request
was made, the State's misrepresentaition of the facts is not a legitimate reason for
the court to deny Mr. Pearson the hearing that he is statutorily entitled to have.

14

In addition, the fact that Mr. Pearson waited seven months before he
renewed his request for the restitution hearing is likewise not a legitimate reason
to deny him said hearing. The court never indicated a time limit within which Mr.
Pearson was required to request the restitution hearing. Instead, the court made
clear at sentencing that negotiations were to continue and a hearing would be held
in the event that a resolution could not be reached.

(Sent. Trans, at 7).

Consequently, at the trial court's instruction, Mr. Pearson initially attempted to
resolve the matter through negotiations. Unfortunately, Mr. Pearson was in jail for
a substantial amount of that time, which offered challenges regarding his
communication with counsel and with the State. However, when it was clear that
negotiations between Mr. Pearson and the State were not going to produce a
mutually amicable result, Mr. Pearson renewed his request for the restitution
hearing pursuant to the trial court's instructions.
However, the trial court declined to hold the restitution hearing, stating in
part that the request was not made until seven months after the sentencing.
However, as stated earlier, it was on the trial court's instruction, that Mr. Pearson
waited several months in attempts to reach an agreement with the state.
Consequently, where the court chose not to immediately schedule a restitution
hearing and instead instructed the parties to negotiate and then to notify the court
in the event a hearing was necessary, it was obligated to conduct that hearing even
seven months later. The court did not give any guidelines regarding a time frame
within which Mr. Pearson was obligated to reassert his right to the restitution

IS

hearing, nor does the statute contain a time frame within which the hearing must
be scheduled.
Furthermore, since the time Mr. Pearson was denied his right to the
restitution hearing, the Utah Legislature has amended the pertinent statute to
explicitly authorize the court to conduct a restitution hearing up to one year after
the request is made. Utah S. 94, S.B. 94, 2005 Gen. Sess. (March 11, 2005). This
demonstrates that the seven-month period was not unreasonable. The Legislature
recognized that it is often difficult to determine restitution and, consequently, it
recognized that it is reasonable for the trial court to conduct the restitution hearing
up to one year after the original request is made. Utah H., Floor Debate on Utah
Senate Bill 94 on the floor of the House, session law chapter 96 (Feb. 9,
2005)(audio recording available from the Office of Legislative Research
homepage:
http://www.le.state.ut.us/isp/idisplay/billaudio.isp?sess-2005GS&bill-sb0094&H
eaders^true).
In conclusion, where Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing at
sentencing, the trial court is statutorily required to hold the hearing. The fact that
Ms. Cameron incorrectly informed the court that no request had been made, nor
the fact that seven months had passed before the hearing was officially scheduled
are legitimate reasons to deny Mr. Pearson his statutory right to a restitution
hearing. The amount of restitution was highly contested and Mr. Pearson had
compelling reasons as to why the amount of restitution should have been lower
16

than the amount proposed by AP&P. Consequently, this Court should remand the
case back to the trial court where it should be instructed to conduct a restitution
hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4).

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SET THE
RESTITUTION
AMOUNT
FOR
MR.
PEARSON
WITHOUT CONSIDERING ANY OF THE REQUIRED
FACTORS OR STATING ITS REASONS FOR THE
RESTITUTION AMOUNT ON THE RECORD.
The Legislature has given trial courts the authority to order a defendant to

pay restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301. However, before the sentencing
court may impose restitution, it must consider specific factors, such as the cost of
the damage or loss of property, the financial resources of the defendant, the
rehabilitative effect of requirement to pay restitution, etc. Utah Code Ann. § 7738a-302(5)(b)(c). The language of the Code does not require the sentencing court
to explicitly note on the record each of the factors listed in the aforementioned
subsections; however, it does require the court consider each factor and then
"make the reasons [for its restitution] decision part of the court record." State v.
Smith, 475 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, %L9, 72 P.3d 692, 701 (Utah App. 2003); Weeks, 458
Utah Adv. Rep. at ^22, 61 P.3d at 1006; State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah
App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3)(emphasis added).
Furthermore, if the sentencing court does not specifically list which factors
it considered, an appellate court may assume the sentencing court considered the
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required factors if to do so would be reasonable. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at
H24, 61 P.3d at 1006-07.
In the instant case, the trial court never made the reasons for its decision
part of the record as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3). At the time it
made its decision, it did not specifically mention any of the factors that it was
required to consider by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c). Furthermore, it is
not reasonable to assume that the trial court considered these factors when it
imposed restitution. At the time restitution was imposed, the court was aware of
the serious dispute over the amount of restitution. Both parties told the court that
the figure derived by AP&P was inaccurate.

Consequently, the court set

restitution in an amount it knew to be inappropriate. In this regard, although the
figure was derived by AP&P, it was derived erroneously, and the court effectively
imposed an arbitrary figure temporarily stating that it would consider all the
relevant factors at the restitution hearing in the event that counsel could not agree
on an accurate figure.1 (Sent. Trans, at 7).
Furthermore, in the instant case the trial court was not authorized to rely on
the amount determined by AP&P and is distinguished from Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000,
for several key reasons. In Weeks, the sentencing court held a restitution hearing
to determine the amount of restitution owed by the defendant. At that hearing, the
defendant did not present any evidence to rebut the restitution amount suggested

1

The amount determined by the court was arbitrary because both Mr. Pearson and the State disagreed with
the figure the court used and the court had not heard arguments to help it determine which amount was
accurate.

IS

by the state. Consequently, the court determined the restitution amount and stated
on the record, "[g]iven what I have reviewed, that being the presentence report, as
well as the orders in the matter, as well as now having heard arguments of counsel,
I [am] persuaded that ... the numbers I have ordered as restitution [are] fair and
reasonable." Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at ^[6, 61 P.3d at 1002. The defendant
challenged the restitution order on the grounds that the trial court "failed to
reference on the record each factor listed in [Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a302(5)(b)(c)]."
In dicta, the court noted that the sentencing court does not need to address
each factor on the record; it only needs to consider each factor and then make
those that it relied on part of the record. Id. at f23, 1006. Furthermore the court
held that, where the sentencing court does not make the factors part of the record,
an appellate court is permitted to assume the sentencing court considered the
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c) if to do so would be
reasonable.
First, in the instant case, Mr. Pearson never had an opportunity to present
evidence to challenge the restitution amount determined by AP&P.

This

information is usually contested at a restitution hearing, and Mr. Pearson was
never afforded this hearing. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, 82 P.3d 211
(Utah App. 2003).

In Weeks, the sentencing court specifically recognized a

defendant's right to challenge the figures cited in the presentence report and relied

1Q

upon by the State. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at ^[20, 61 P.3d at 1005. However,
because no hearing has been held, Mr. Pearson was not afforded this opportunity.
Second, in the instant case, the sentencing court did not reference any of the
factors listed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c). Nor did it even indicate
that it had considered any of these factors when it set the restitution amount. In
actuality, the sentencing court effectively indicated that it had not considered any
of the relevant factors when it indicated that "all of the claims" would be inquired
into at the restitution hearing. (Sent. Trans, at 7). Consequently, the court did not
list any of the factors on which it relied nor did it indicate that it had considered
the factors.
Third, in the instant case, it is not reasonable to assume that the sentencing
court considered the required factors. There was no trial conducted in the instant
case, the guilty verdict was reached through a plea. Consequently, the court did
not hear testimony surrounding the alleged charges and monetary losses.
Furthermore, at the time restitution was discussed, both parties considered the
figure inaccurate and indicated that a restitution hearing might be necessary. (See
Sent. Trans, at 5). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the court explained that all of the
claims surrounding the dispute over the restitution amount would be considered at
the restitution hearing in the event the parties could not agree on an accurate
figure. Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that the court considered all the
factors before setting the restitution amount in the instant case.
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It should also be noted that Mr. Pearson vehemently contests the restitution
amount reached by AP&P. DABC retained the use and possession of many items
that were considered by AP&P when it calculated its restitution figure for Mr.
Pearson. Moreover, many items purchased were purchased legitimately. As a
result, those items that DABC retained should not be considered a "loss" that was
suffered as a result of Mr. Pearson's actions. For example, where Mr. Pearson
bought workout equipment to create a gym for the employees of DABC, as he was
authorized to do, and DABC still has possession of that equipment and allows its
employees to use and benefit from that possession, the gym equipment should not
be considered a "loss" that DABC suffered. However, in the instant case, Mr.
Pearson was never given a restitution hearing, and, consequently, never given an
opportunity to present this and much additional information to the court.

As a

result, appellate review of the restitution order, to determine if the amount is
reasonable, is impossible where no insight into the court's rationale is discernible
from the record.
In conclusion, the trial court erred when it failed to state on the record the
reasons by which it determined Mr. Pearson's restitution.

Consequently, Mr.

Pearson cannot adequately challenge the findings where the reasoning of the court
is absent from the record.

As a result, this Court should remand the case back to

the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7738a-302(4) where it can properly consider all of the factors required by Utah Code

01

Ann. § 77-28a-302(5)(b)(c) and slate the reasons by which it determines the
restitution amount on the record.
A.

This issue was preserved at sentencing when the trial court
indicated that it would inquire into all the claims at the
restitution hearing.

As a general rule, a claim must be preserved before the trial court or it may
not be raised on appeal. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \% 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah
2002). However, an appellate court may hear a claim that was not properly
preserved through objection where 1he trial court considered the issue sua sponte.
State v. Jaegar, 973 P.2d 404, 208 FN 4 (Utah 1999). There are two major policy
considerations supporting the preservation requirement: (1) to give the trial court
an opportunity to address the claimed error, and, if appropriate, correct it; and (2)
to prevent a defendant from omitting an objection in hopes of an acquittal and
then, when that strategy fails, claiming on appeal that the appellate court should
reverse, /rf. at Tf 10, 323-33.
In the instant case, the trial court recognized that it had not considered all of
the information surrounding the restitution amount. The Court further stated that
any and all of those issues would be addressed at the restitution hearing.
Consequently, it noted the objections to the amount and determination of
restitution sua sponte and then it determined that those issues would be considered
at a later date. The court later declined to grant the promised restitution hearing.
However, the issue was sufficiently preserved when the trial court recognized, sua
sponte, that both parties disagreed with the amount of restitution and it knew the
22

parties would need the court to make specific findings as to how it determined
restitution.
Furthermore, both policy reasons for the requirement of preservation are
satisfied in the instant case. First, the trial court was on notice that it needed to
make the reasons for its restitution decision part of the record because it raised the
issue sua sponte and indicated it would do so during the restitution hearing.
Second, this was not an attempt by the defendant to forgo an objection in an
attempt to get a later reversal. The trial court indicated it would put the necessary
findings on the record at the restitution hearing and Mr. Pearson had no reason to
suspect that the trial court would decline to hold the hearing.

Consequently,

policy reasons weigh in favor of finding this issue was preserved.
B.

In the alternative, it was plain error for the court to
fail to indicate on the record the reasons by which it
determined the restitution amount, where it was not
reasonable to assume the court had considered the
required factors.

Generally, a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is
barred from asserting it initially on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,
922 (Utah App. 1991). However, a well-established exception to this rule applies
when the trial court committed "plain error". "Plain error" exists when (1) the
error is "plain", in other words, the error should have been obvious to the trial
court that it was committing error; and (2) the error affected the substantial rights
of the accused, in other words, the error was harmful. Id.

IT

First, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. The trial court
specifically recognized that, if the parties couldn't reach an agreement, then a
restitution hearing would be necessary to determine "all claims" surrounding the
restitution amount. Therefore, the court recognized, at the sentencing hearing, the
need to put the factors on the record. However, it refused to hold the restitution
hearing in order to do so. The statute and case law are clear that the court must
consider all required statutory factors, and it must then put the reasons for its
decision on the record. See generally Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-302. Consequently,
the trial court was aware of its statutory requirements, and it verbally recognized
the need to accomplish these requirements; therefore, when the trial court failed to
indicate on the record the reason as to how it determined Mr. Pearson's restitution
amount, it committed "plain error."
Second, the error affected the substantial rights of Mr. Pearson.

Mr.

Pearson had legitimate information to present to the court, wrhich would have
shown the amount of restitution to be much less than that initially suggested in the
presentence report. Consequently, when the trial court did not explain the reasons
by which it determined the restitution, it has severely impaired Mr. Pearson's right
to contest the amount. Mr. Pearson is entitled to appeal an unjust and unfounded
restitution order; however, when the court fails to put on the record the reasons by
which it determined the amount of restitution, it becomes impossible for the
defendant to contest the amount. Haston, 811 P.2d at 937. Therefore, the trial
court's failure to explain on the record the reasons by which it determined the
74

amount of restitution affected his substantial right to an appeal regarding that
determination and was also harmful to him insomuch that he is being forced to pay
a restitution amount that is likely much higher than that which the statute
authorizes.
In conclusion, the issue was preserved when the trial court recognized that
there was a need to have the reasons for the restitution amount put on the record
and indicated that would be done at the restitution hearing. In the alternative, if
the issue was not sufficiently preserved, then it was plain error for the trial court to
neglect the duties imposed on it by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 where it was
aware of the requirements and its failure to abide by those requirements impaired
Mr. Pearson's substantial rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Defendant, RICHARD PEARSON,
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order refusing the hearing and
REMAND this case back to the trial court for a restitution hearing in compliance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ff

day of April, 2005.

PEfSfc D J a f o D ALL
Attorney for Appellant
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Bever M. Wells Building
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P.O. Box 140854
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ADDENDUM I

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution
as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning
as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether restitution is
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in
Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the
time of sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full
hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity,
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and

treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law
of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted
in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the
offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b)
and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this
Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the
victim.
Laws 2001. c. 137. § 8. eff. April 30. 2001; Laws 2002. c. 35. § 13. eff. May 6.
2002; Laws 2002. c. 185. $ 51. eff. May 6. 2002; Laws 2003. c. 285. § 1. eff. May
5.2003.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES

vs.

Case No: 031906848 FS

RICHARD WARREN PEARSON,
Defendant.
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

J DENNIS FREDERICK
February 20, 2 004

S.a*37573&
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
PRESENT
OFJUDGMENTS
Clerk:
cindyb
DATE,
^V>^£jr
Prosecutor: HARMS, CLARK A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RASMUSSEN, THOMAS V
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 28, 1941
Video
Tape Number:

1

Tape C o u n t :

9:02-9:

CHARGES
1. MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/19/2003
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/19/2003
3. MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/19/2003
4. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/19/2003
5. MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea:.Guilty - Disposition: 12/19/2003

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

Criminal Sentence @J

031906848

Page 1

JD13674651
PEARSON.RICHARD WARREN

\lfvi»

Case No: 031906848
Date:
Feb 20, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's convLCtion of MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant LS sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen y€>ars in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspei
Based on the defendant * s
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of nc
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah Sta
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY a 2nd
t)egree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one y€*ar nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison,
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of MISUSE PUBLIC MONEY a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison,
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison terms to run consecutive.
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Case No: 031906848
Date:
Feb 20, 2004
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $131541.13 Plus Interest
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Defendant to make regular monthly payments towards restitution in
the amount to be determined by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to pay restitution in full within the probation term.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Pay restitution as ordered within the probation term.
Serve 150 days in the Salt Lake County Jail (ADC) as a condition of
probation.
Complete cognitive restructuring classes as directed by Adult
Probation and Parole.
Defendant may not be employed in a position of financial
responsibilityThe Court orders that defendant is disqualified from holding any
public office for the remainder of his life as stated per statute.
*THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT REPORT TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL
(ADC) ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 AT 9:00 A.M. TO BE COMMITTED
FORTHWITH FOR 150 DAYS AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION. (CONCURRENT
COUNTS)*
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Case No: 031906848
Date:
Feb 20, 2004
Dated this

Paqe 4 (last)
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ADDENDUM III

JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON #1607
Attorney for Defendant
427 27th Street
Ogden,UT 84401
Phone: 801-622-9100
Fax: 801-394-7706
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
AS COUNSEL, MOTION FOR
RESTITUTION HEARING AND
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
Case No. 031906848

Comes now, John Blair Hutchison, Attorney at Law, who hereby enters his appearance as
counsel for the defendant in the above-entitled matter upon the charges of: THREE (3)
COUNTS OF MISUSE OF PUBLIC MONEY, THEFT and COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD and
further, requests a Restitution Hearing on behalf of said defendant. Pursuant to Rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor is requested to furnish documentation as to how
the Restitution a"mount of $131,541.13 was calculated that the defendant has beert Ordered to

pay.
DATED this 8th day of September 2004.

0/Ci^/yLcnJu^
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
Attorney for Defendant
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State v. Pearson
CaseNa.031906848
Entry of Appearance and Motion for
Restitution Hearing and Discovery
Page 2 of!

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I faxed and/or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
original on the 8th day of September 2004 to the following:
Anne A. Cameron
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 S. State #S3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Fax: 801-468-2622
Court Clerk
Third District Court
450 S. State Street
P.O. Box 1860
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Fax: 801-238-7404

'^^Tyyfm^m^Jd-Legal Assistant

ADDENDUM IV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CFlttFttftfUCTCOUBT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF u f M P Judicial District

NOV 1 6 2004
THE STATE OF UTAH,

lAtrUKI

Plaintiff,

m

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 031906848

vs.

Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
RICHARD WARREN PIERSON,
November 12, 2004
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion for Restitution Hearing and Request for
Discovery. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the
Motion on November 5, 2004. Following the hearing, the matter
was taken under advisement. The Court having considered the
motion and memoranda, as well as the arguments of counsel, hereby
enters the following ruling.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), Defendant's
request is untimely as the motion was not made, nor any objection
voiced, until seven months after the sentencing. Moreover, the
presentence report in this case provides an accurate outline of
the amounts misused and their destinations, and defendant had
access to this report and the discovery which detailed the
State's accounting. Finally, in State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 61
P. 3d 1000, the Utah Supreme Court held that restitution based
upon the information in a presentence report is a sufficient
basis upon which the Court may determine an order of restitution.
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Restitution
Hearing and Request for Discovery is not well taken and,
accordingly, denied.,
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DATED t h i s

f

/V^day

of November,

2004.

J. D
DISTHIC

vftle*'

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 031906848 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

\{p day of

V\.P\f >

NAME
ANNE A CAMERON
ATTORNEY PLA
111 E BROADWAY STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
ATTORNEY DEF
4 27 27TH ST
OGDEN UT 84401
, 20£>H

C. fahW

Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM V

PETER D. GOOD ALL #9718
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
.Case No. 031906848
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON,
Defendant.

: JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant/Appellant, RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, by and through his attorney of
record, PETER D. GOOD ALL, hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal this Honorable Court's
ruling denying him a restitution hearing in the above captioned case. The Defendant is the party
taking the instant appeal. The appeal will be taken from the Third District Court, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick presiding. The instant appeal will be taken to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The following issues and orders will be raised on appeal: Defendant will appeal this Court's
order denying his request for a restitution hearing, which was filed on November 16, 2004.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _{^_ day of December, 2004.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

By ^ P ^ l ^ = ^
PETER D. GOODALL

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal, this \{$^ day of December, 2004, to the following:
Anne A. Cameron
Assistant District Attorney
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
111 East 300 South, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Court Reporter for Judge Eyre
c/o Jody Myer
Fourth Judicial District Court
125 North 100 West
Provo, Utah 84601
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